Law enforcement agencies around the res publica have been all too eager to take in aggregative surveillance technologies , but sometimes they have put little effort into ensuring the systems are secure and the sensitive data they call for on quotidian hoi polloi is protect .
subject in point : automatise license plate recognition(ALPR ) systems .
Earlier this year , EFF get a line that more than a hundred ALPR tv camera were exposed online , often with totally receptive Web pages accessible by anyone with a internet browser . In five cases , we were able to track the cameras to their source : St. Tammany Parish Sheriff ’s Office , Jefferson Parish Sheriff ’s Office , and the Kenner Police in Louisiana ; Hialeah Police Department in Florida ; and the University of Southern California ’s public safety section . These cases are very alike , but unrelated to , major vulnerabilities in Boston ’s ALPR networkuncoveredin September by DigBoston and the Boston Institute for Nonprofit Journalism .
After five calendar month of date with these entities , we are unfreeze the results of our inquiry and the actions these offices undertook in reply to our monition .
What is ALPR?
ALPRs are networks of cameras that take pictures of every passing car and beguile data on each gondola ’s license plate act , admit the time , date , and location where the vehicle was photographed . ALPR tv camera are often mounted on patrol railroad car or affix to stationary wayside social organisation , such as unclouded poles and traffic signals .
The systems will alert police when a camera recognise a car on a “ hot list , ” an index of car that are stolen or believed to be tied to criminal bodily function . However , most ALPR organisation collect and store data on every railcar ( i.e. they do n’t distinguish between suspects and devoid civilian ) . Even if a vehicle is n’t involved in a crime , data on where it was and when may be salt away for many years , just in case the vehicle later comes under suspicion . Consequently , a breach of an ALPR system is a falling out of potentially every machine driver ’s travel history . Depending on how much data has been collected , this selective information in totality can disclose all sorts of personal info , including what doctors you visit , what protests you attend , and where you go , shop , adoration , and sleep at night .
The ALPR systems at the center of our probe were sell by a society called PIPS Technology , which has since been bought by 3M. In 2011 , prior to the attainment , the party bragged of installing more than 20,000 cameras around the globe . After independent security research worker alerted us to the vulnerability , we get word that many stationary ALPR cameras from PIPS were individually connect to the Internet and freely accessible online to anyone who have intercourse where to look .
In some cases , anyone could open a windowpane and view a tv camera ’s alive television current and witness the plate seizure in real time . There was basically nothing to end someone from siphoning off the stream of ALPR data point in transmitting or potentially controlling the cameras . The agencies that ostensibly master the ALPR systems had n’t even put in place warning language about unauthorized access code to the systems .
When asked about the vulnerability , 3 M provided EFF with this publish statement :
We can not comment on issues PIPS may have had prior to the acquirement , but I can tell you any issues with our products are taken very seriously and directly addressed with the customer .
We fend behind the security lineament of our television camera . 3 M ’s ALPR tv camera have inherent security measures , which must be enabled , such as password protection for the sequent , Telnet and web port . These security features are clearly explain in our publicity .
To the agency ’ credit , all the Louisiana federal agency and the University of Southern California ( USC ) have now strike action to secure the system .
A Brief History of ALPR Vulnerability Research
A few years ago , security researchers begin to ring the consternation over what they originally misidentified as century of red - brightness level cameras that were tie to the Internet without any security system touchstone in place . The cameras were circulate throughout the state , with two trenchant clusters in California and Louisiana .
in the first place this year , EFF began bore down on the data and confirmed that these were not dealings cameras at all , but stationary ALPR systems — networks of cameras mounted on street pole to capture the shell of pass cars as part of ongoing law enforcement trawl surveillance programme .
The first big backsheesh we received occur from John Matherly , the security specialiser behindShodan , a search railway locomotive that scans and catalog connected equipment and computer hardware , i.e. the Internet of Things . If you plugged certain keywords into Shodan , the site retrieved hundreds of PIPS camera systems connected to the Internet , often with control panels open and completely approachable through a Web internet browser . At the meter , Matherly and his fellow worker Dan Tentler foreground these vulnerability at certificate league . CNN even talked about these tv camera while boast Tentler ’s workplace .
When CNN contacted 3 M in 2013 , the party disclaim obligation :
3 thou spokeswoman Jacqueline Berry note that Autoplate ’s systems have robust security protocols , including password protective covering and encoding . They just have to be used .
“ We ’re very confident in the security department of our systems , ” she said .
Independently , a research worker namedDarius Freamonfound that you could get at the control instrument panel via Telnet and give statistic about plate capture . Building off Freamon ’s work , a team of electronic computer scientist at the University of Arizonadug further into the data and discover vulnerable cameras in Washington , California , Texas , Oklahoma , Louisiana , Mississippi , Alabama , Florida , Virginia , Ohio , and Pennsylvania . The largest clump was in southeastern Louisiana .
Alarmingly , these investigator reported :
We were able to observe the number plate information and live images . We were also able-bodied to modify the shape setting .
Matherly revisited the issue this yr , presenting at the Hack in the Box conferenceon how he easily siphoned 64,000 plate epitome and corresponding locational data gunpoint from these photographic camera over a one - week period .
EFF began confirm this inquiry in spring 2015 . We tested more than 100 camera , documenting when they had publicly viewable configuration Web pages , Telnet access code , and specially when a visitant was capable to view live provender and capture data point . The testing process involved confirming that a television camera was online and respond to petition by connecting to it with a Web web internet browser or by connecting to it over Telnet . If the camera had a password on both the Web and Telnet interface we leave it alone , but if the tv camera was not protected with a password we were capable to recover configuration information . However , when the WWW was locked down , but Telnet was not , we were sometimes capable to watch password entropy in the Telnet constellation . Often these passwords were set to the default or were otherwise not sophisticated enough to be secure .
We also began to use entropy embedded in these pages to represent out the specific location of these camera , which we then connect to tidings articles and public records show which agencies were in all likelihood responsible for the cameras ( the USC cameras were obvious , because they had giveaway universal resource locator , such as “ Pipscam7.usc.edu ” ) . Using info contained within the shape and Google Streetview , we were able-bodied pinpoint the location of these cameras .
Vulnerability Disclosures
As longtime critics of mass surveillance systems , EFF would like nothing more than to see a law enforcement agency take its ALPR net offline . In fact , in letters and emails we send to the agencies , we advised that a shut down would be the most effective cadence . But that ’s a decision for the office to make , not data processor researchers . Our not bad business concern was see to it that , if they were run to extend to use these systems , they not put the public ’s privacy at risk of a data breach .
When probing the ALPR systems , EFF was careful to abide by and document our finding . We did not change any configurations or otherwise tamper with the system . Instead , we connected to the systems via Web browsers and public Telnet interfaces . We assume notes and screen capture , and used that data point to compose our letters to the agencies . At that time , we told the agencies that we would not bring out our datum until they had enough time to repair the gaping jam in their security department .
EFF is not publish the letters we sent or the communications we received in reception . However , we encourage newsman to nonplus questions and file public records request . The agencies themselves are best suited to acknowledge what data can and can not be released .
We are , however , easy sharing images and oecumenical description of what we recover — including the placement of the cameras , most of which are otherwise seeable on the street .
Southeastern Louisiana
We have created this interactive map record the placement of around 40 ALPR camera base on data contained in each camera ’s configuration .
Launch single-valued function of suspected ALPR camera in southeastern Louisiana(Note , this map is host by Google . If you click this data link , your sojourn to Google Maps will be govern by Google ’s privacy policy . )
These geolocation point may not be 100 % accurate , since the placement descriptions of some cameras were often vague or misspelled . Whenever potential , we confirmed the creation of each photographic camera using Google Streetview . In those cases , follow the nexus to see the camera ’s accurate positioning .
The Louisiana cameras were generally clustered on the north and south Sir Joseph Banks of Lake Pontchartrain . News articlesindicated that agencies in the area lead off add the PIPS television camera as early as 2008 . At first we could not definitively influence which cameras belonged to which bureau , so we sent letter and emails to five separate way . It turn out just about half the tv camera belong to the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Office , half belonged to the Kenner Police Department , and at least one camera belonged to the Jefferson Parish Sheriff ’s Office .
St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office
When contacted by EFF , the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff ’s Office immediately began reevaluating their systems and investigating both short - term and longer - terminal figure reparation to control the systems were not publicly approachable . The agency lease in daily conversations with contractors and site visit to each tv camera . EFF also honour the agency ’s request to rescan the devices once the new security criterion were put in place .
As of publication , we consider the St. Tammany system has been secured .
Kenner Police Department
Early on , we believed these cameras could have belong to the Jefferson Parish Sheriff ’s Office , base on news articles about the way ’s long - run ALPR organization .
However , thanks to the cooperation of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff ’s Office — which communicated with several other federal agency — we were able to determine that the other batch of camera belonged to the Kenner Police Department ( KPD ) .
KPD procure the cameras within a topic of weeks .
Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office
Once we had egest the Kenner and St. Tammany Parish cameras from our list of vulnerable ALPR cameras , one single tv camera remained . This one , positioned near a church in the Woodmere field , was peculiarly vulnerable .
An example of what we able to view ( plate have been redacted to protect the concealment of the drivers ):
The Jefferson Parish Sheriff ’s Office initially did not respond to our communicating ; however , it seems that after transmit with counterparts in St. Tammany Parish , it was capable to secure this camera . Eventually , the Jefferson Parish Sheriff did answer : a congresswoman support the television camera was now inviolable , but to double check , they planned to remove the television camera for a expert review .
University of Southern California
USC had far fewer ALPR cameras exposed than those in Louisiana — only four of what is likely a 60 - plus photographic camera internet . However , these four cameras were even more vulnerable than the Louisiana photographic camera , since their controls were hosted on public university page , with obvious URLs such as pipscam9.usc.edu .
Pipscam9 was peculiarly problematic . Located on “ Fraternity Row ” ( see ithere ) and directly across from the Pi Kappa Phi house , the ALPR camera was wholly unprotected . One could not only see the permit plate passing down the street , but also watch a bouncy video provender ( below ) of the great unwashed cut through the street .
Another Seth of cameras was similarly viewable in a residential vicinity at twenty-ninth St. and Hoover .
In correspondence with EFF , USC Department of Public Safety Chief John Thomas confirm our finding after beginning a system of rules - wide-cut audited account . Vulnerable camera were take offline . USC also meliorate the complexity of the ALPR administrative passwords .
Thomas write :
As a result of your email I trust we have a more secure ALPR environs and are concentre on foreclose this from happening again in the future . I am encouraged by the theory of the Department of Public Safety and EFF let open dialogue regarding entropy security and will continue working toward a dependable law-breaking suppression engineering environment .
We afterward require USC for its ALPR datum retention policies , but Thomas did not respond to the request . Under a new natural law , USC will need to disclose that info protrude in 2016 ( see S.B. 34 below ) .
Hialeah, Florida
Our enquiry become up at least two cameras in Hialeah , a city in Miami - Dade County , Florida . One of these cameras was near a public firing range and gun shop , positioned in such a way as to catch licenses home base that turned right out of the parking batch .
We initiated give-and-take with Hialeah ’s staff , who assured us they would take care of the system . However , they have since stop answer to our calls .
Legislation
While we agreed not to verbalize publically about these system when the security return had yet to be addressed , we felt it was important to utilize this inquiry to inform conclusion over major ALPR - related statute law in California and Louisiana .
Louisiana Senate Bill 250
EFF contacted Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal ’s legislative staff , who were weighing whether the governor would sign or prohibit a bill that would have create a massive statewide ALPR connection statewide used to identify uninsured motorists . We expressed our opposition to the legislation , explain that the government should not expand ALPR surveillance when it has not demonstrate it can safely manage the system currently in billet . Subsequently , the governor vetoed the bill , save :
Senate Bill No . 250 would authorize the purpose of machinelike license dental plate lector television camera surveillance programs in various parish throughout the nation . The personal info bewitch by these photographic camera , which includes a person ’s vehicle emplacement , would be retained in a fundamental database and accessible to not only take part law enforcement agencies but other specified individual entity for a catamenia of time regardless of whether or not the system detects that person is in violation of vehicle indemnity essential . Camera programme such as these make secret information pronto available beyond the scope of lawn enforcement , pose a underlying danger to personal privateness and create large pocket billiards of information belonging to law abiding citizens that can be exceedingly vulnerable to theft of misuse .
California Senate Bill 34
The California legislature passed a greenback that classify ALPR information as “ personal information ” under the State Department ’s data breach notification constabulary . The bill required any ALPR operator , including secret institutions such as USC , to “ preserve reasonable security procedures and praxis , include operational , administrative , technical , and strong-arm safeguard , to protect ALPR data from unauthorized access , destruction , use , modification , or disclosure . ” In addition , ALPR system manipulator are required to publicly post elaborate utilization and privacy policies .
EFF spell a alphabetic character in support of the measure and described the situation with USC to the governor ’s office staff to emphasise that the problems with ALPR were not suppositional . On October 6 , Gov. Jerry Brown signed the government note into law .
Conclusion
While EFF was able to affect ALPR system security in these jurisdiction , dozens of cameras may still be vulnerable in some human body . However , in many cases , tracking these devices to their sources has been impossible . It is our hope that with publication of this theme , all agencies responsible for PIPS cameras , wherever they are in the state , induct comprehensive certificate audits of their devices . ALPR systems are a manikin of mass surveillance , unmistakable and simple . This technology captures information on every driver , regardless of whether they are under suspicion . In fact , whenEFF and the ACLU send a public record requestfor ALPR data to the Los Angeles Police Department and Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Office , the agencies refused to reach over the datum , citing a proviso in California law that allows them to withhold investigative records . Who are they investigating?The answer : all cars in California .
If law enforcement authority are going to pursue this technology , then they should limit repositing of this datum to as short a time menstruum as possible — days , not years or indefinitely , as is the current practice of many agencies . The safest policy would be to not stack away data point unrelated to crimes at all , but only beguile information on spicy - name fomite suspected of involvement in offence .
As these cases illustrate , when law of nature enforcement agencies use surveillance systems , they need to be far more wakeful in ensuring that the technology is secure before they deploy it . They must also go forward to develop system of rules to protect against emerging threats and vulnerability . What was cutting sharpness in 2008 is unconvincing to stand firm the advanced threat of 2015 .
Law enforcement should not take in selective information they ca n’t protect . Surveillance technology without enough security measures puts everyone ’s safety at risk .
This article first appeared on Electronic Frontier Foundation and is republish here under Creative Commons license .
Image byMr . Leedsunder Creative Commons licence .
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